The challenges to cinema as an art in Visual Studio .NET Print Code 128 in Visual Studio .NET The challenges to cinema as an art

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The challenges to cinema as an art using barcode creation for .net framework control to generate, create qr code jis x 0510 image in .net framework applications. Microsoft's .NET Framework not thereby make it into an a Visual Studio .NET QR Code 2d barcode rt form. Likewise, consider photographs of paintings that illustrate art textbooks.

These photographs are undoubtedly of artworks, but that does not thereby make the photographs themselves artworks. Indeed, someone might be alarmed to hear that the photographer intended to make an artwork: is he presenting us with a faithful copy of the original painting, one might wonder Now call it the transfer fallacy when genuine features of content are ipso facto ascribed to the vehicle carrying that content. Then we have an instance of the transfer fallacy when the artistic status of cinematic content is ipso facto ascribed to the photographic vehicle carrying that content.

So merely noting the existence of lms that are undoubtedly works of art does not in itself show that lms are an art form. Interestingly, at least one modern writer, Roger Scruton, has pressed a related point, and has questioned the status of cinema as an art. Scruton s views on photography have been the subject of a great deal of critical discussion.

4 But their evident bearing on cinema, stressed by Scruton himself, has earned less attention, and it has also often been missed that Scruton s objections are closely related to the sort of worries that early lm theorists such as Arnheim were trying to silence. But Scruton somewhat shies away from the full implications of his view as far as lms are concerned. He holds that A lm is a photograph of a dramatic representation; it is not, because it cannot be, a photographic representation.

It follows that if there is such a thing as a cinematic masterpiece it will be so because like Wild Strawberries and La r gle du jeu it is in the rst place a dramatic masterpiece .5 He holds that cinema is not an independent art form: independent, that is, of the theatre, from which it borrows so many conventions .6 So his position appears to be that cinema is a dependent art form presumably, that it is an art form if it ful ls certain conditions, such as recording something with artistic content.

But as the examples of CDs and catalogue photographs show, the fact that something is a recording of a work of art does not thereby make it into a work of art. So the radical challenge is this: given that the photographic basis of cinema is simply a recording device, however can cinema be an art form . Roger Scruton, Photography a nd Representation , Fantasy, Imagination and the Screen and The Photographic Surrogate . For critical discussion of Scruton s views on photography, see David Davies, How Photographs Signify : Cartier-Bresson s Reply to Scruton ; William L. King, Scruton and Reasons for Looking at Photographs ; Dominic McIver Lopes, The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency and Robert Wicks, Photography as a Representational Art .

Though Scruton s work is not explicitly discussed by them, for points pertinent to his claims, see also Barbara Savedo , Transforming Images: Photographs of Representations and Nigel Warburton, Photographic Communication . Scruton, Photography and Representation , p. 102.

6 Ibid.. A Philosophy of Cinematic Art It is worth examining Scruton s arguments in detail, since they throw much light on how one might esh out the challenge to the status of cinema as an art. His claim about lm rests on the photographic basis of the medium. He holds that photography is not a representational art, i.

e., an art of representations. (He allows that one could take an aesthetic interest in photographs conceived merely as lines and shapes, i.

e., photography conceived as an abstract art.7) This is, in the rst instance, because photographs are not representations at all.

He holds that for something to be a representation requires that it express or communicate thoughts.8 For an image to express a thought about a subject it must stand in an intentional relation to that subject, since intentionality is the general mark of thought. In contrast, if an image stands in a merely causal relation to its subject, it cannot express thoughts about it.

Paintings stand in an intentional relation to their subjects and thus are representations; photographs stand in a causal relation to their subjects and thus are not representations, but mere simulacra. However, Scruton is careful to qualify this claim by saying that he is referring to ideal photography, by which he means a logical ction, a type of photography unpolluted by the attempts of photographers to ape the methods of painting, by manipulating photographs through touching them up, using multiple exposures or montage, etc.9 Scruton understands the di erence between causal and intentional relations in the following way, instanced by the two kinds of images.

Since a causal relation obtains, from the existence of an (ideal) photograph of a subject it logically follows that its subject exists, that the subject appears roughly as it appears in the photograph, and that its appearance in the photograph is its appearance at a particular moment.10 In contrast, (ideal) painting stands in an intentional relation to its subject: it does not logically follow from the existence of the painting that its subject exists, or that the painting represents its subject as it is, or that there is some particular of the type the painting represents.11 So because photography essentially involves a causal relation to its subject and painting an intentional relation to its subject, (ideal) photographs, unlike (ideal) paintings, do not express thoughts and therefore are not representations.

There are two further points to note. First, though Scruton s argument employs the notion of intentionality in a general sense, he takes intentions in the narrow sense (a particular kind of intentional state) to be the crucial psychological states involved in di erentiating.
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