Magnetic Stripe in .NET Integration Data Matrix in .NET Magnetic Stripe

How to generate, print barcode using .NET, Java sdk library control with example project source code free download:
Magnetic Stripe using barcode implementation for .net vs 2010 control to generate, create datamatrix image in .net vs 2010 applications. bar code Most smart cards belong barcode data matrix for .NET to a family of standardized cards referred to as Class I ID cards. We"ll look at the specifications for these cards in a bit more detail in 3.

Such cards have a well-defined size, including length, width, and thickness. These cards also have fixed positions for all the printing and information storage mechanisms typically used on cards. One such mechanism, which is quite prevalent on smart cards, is a magnetic stripe.

This is a narrow strip of material affixed to the "back" of the smart card. The back of the card is the face of the card opposite the contact face plate. The magnetic stripe material is typically a ferrous alloy, which will retain a magnetic field imprinted on it by an electromagnetic write head such as is used in a tape recorder.

Characters can be imprinted on this magnetic stripe according an ISO/IEC specification. The information is redundantly recorded in two or three tracks defined within the stripe. By swiping the card past a read head, the information recorded on the stripe can be extracted for use on an attached computer system.

Information is typically stored on a magnetic stripe in a redundant fashion; that is, information is stored more than once at various positions within the magnetic stripe. When the information is read off of a magnetic stripe, the redundant components can be checked for integrity (e.g.

, a checksum) and for consistency. This allows the retrieval of information even if the magnetic stripe is worn or damaged..

Embossing Embossing is a techniqu VS .NET Data Matrix 2d barcode e for printing characters on the surface of a card such that the characters are raised above the general level of the face of the card. By inserting such a card into a printing press-like mechanism, it is easy to print a copy of the characters found on the card onto a paper receipt.

The characters printed on the card are usually an account number, which provides an unambiguous connection back to an account of the cardholder. Other scanning techniques that can be used on other elements of the card (bar codes, magnetic stripe) are more reliable and provide better integration of the card information into host systems than does embossing. Consequently, embossing is perhaps not as important or used as routinely as in years past.

Embossing is, however, perhaps the most straightforward and externally visible technique for monitoring information on the card. Thus, it is perhaps the preferred "method of last resort.".

Printing The face (and back) of visual .net gs1 datamatrix barcode a card also can be printed in a "normal," multicolor printed format. This printing may include uniquely identifying material related to the cardholder, for example, a picture of the cardholder.

This provides a mechanism for connecting the cardholder to the card. Anyone presented with such a card can easily compare the picture to the actual person presenting the card. Printing on the face and back of the card also can be used to identify other entities associated with the card.

For example, the name of a bank that issued the card might be included, or the name and logo of a bank association responsible for the standards associated with the card. Security The smart card is largely about security. In the construction of the card, security comes in several guises, in the structure of the ICC and its modular packaging embedding of the ICC module in the card body techniques used to communicate with the card techniques used to manipulate information within the ICC in the card.

Much of the way that th e smart card is constructed, programmed, and used is replete with measures designed to enhance the security of the system. We"ll examine both directly and indirectly many of the attacks used to try to compromise the smart card. It should be noted that security measures for smart card systems are in a constant state of evolution in response to the constant evolution of attack mechanisms.

Historically, there are a variety of attacks against smart cards, which are facilitated by the external provision of power and programming (clock) control to the card. One such class of attack is termed "power analysis." This approach makes use of knowing sequences of commands that are to be executed by the smart card processor and, by monitoring in very fine-grained steps the power consumed by the smart card processor, determining which commands are being executed; including determining the values of parameters used to trigger switching among processing pathways in the command sequences.

This approach is particularly adept at isolating cryptographic operations involving the use of keys; that is, encryption and decryption operations. In some instances, the breaking of cryptographic keys can be greatly enhanced (speeded up) by power analysis. The counter to this type of attack is to be cognizant of the attack mechanism while creating the on-card code which will effect the cryptographic operations.

The cryptographic algorithms can be coded so that power analysis is greatly diminished as a viable attack. Of course, it should be remembered that to make use of such an attack means that the card must be in the hands of the attacker. This means that the cardholder should be able to detect the loss of the card and report it, allowing the information (e.

g., keys) contained on the card to be invalidated..

Another attack, which i Visual Studio .NET DataMatrix s somewhat similar, is termed "differential fault analysis." In this form of attack, a particular (usually cryptographic) operation is initiated and then an error is induced into the card operation causing an error response from the algorithm.

If the error can be induced repeatedly, it is possible to glean information from the error responses that is useful in breaking the on-card keys. As we"ll discover when we look at a couple of specific (commercial) smart cards in 6, this type of attack can be diminished by reducing the information returned by an error condition within the computation. Attacks such as these are damaging to a system at large in the case where information from a single card can somehow be used to compromise a larger segment of the system in which it works.

If the information gleaned from a single card can only impact that single cardholder, then the integrity of the overall system can generally be maintained. Specifically, if the attacker must have physical possession of the card in order to pursue a particular attack mechanism, then the cardholder has an opportunity to notice the missing card and report it to the system"s administrators. In this case, strictly personal information, such as a (cryptographic) key used to establish the identity of the cardholder, can be invalidated and reissued.

Probably the greater risk to the individual cardholder are attacks aimed at intercepting information as it flows between the card and the terminal configuration. If an attacker can access this information stream and extract useful information without the knowledge of the cardholder, then damage might well be done to the cardholder. We will look at a number of such attack mechanisms and the defenses against them throughout the remainder of this book.

Again, the bottom line is that new attacks are being discovered or refined all the time. Then, defenses of those attacks are developed and made part of the smart card methodology. Continuing vigilance of attacks and defenses is necessary on the part of those who develop and deploy smart card-based systems.

Anti-counterfeiting Printing or other preparation of a smart card can contain a variety of elements that guard against the card being counterfeited. One such mechanism is a white light hologram affixed to the face of a card. Such holograms cannot be directly copied with normal electrostatic copying machines.

Further, it is typically quite expensive to create a copy hologram. Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible for a counterfeiter to correctly reproduce the physical appearance of a specific smart card. Just as with currency, certain printing elements may be included on the face of a card that are difficult or impossible to copy with normal copying machines.

One such mechanism is extremely fine-line artwork. If line widths much finer than the resolution of copying machines are used, then running a copy of the card will result in fuzzy areas on the face of the card. Perhaps the best anti-counterfeiting mechanism provided by a smart card is the ability of the ICC on the card to support complex identification protocols.

Such protocols, generally based on the sharing of secret information between the on-card and off-card computers, are very difficult (and expensive) to crack. This means that. it can be virtually imp ossible for an attacker to get a card to communicate (with an attacking system) long enough to extract any useful information from the card..
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