Acting from duty in .NET Display Data Matrix barcode in .NET Acting from duty

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Acting from duty generate, create data matrix barcode none with .net projects QR Code Symbol Versions own happiness is Visual Studio .NET gs1 datamatrix barcode at least indirectly morally relevant. Duty is best done from duty, but with a glad heart.

31 Nonetheless, some worries remain. First, it is not obvious that Kant s dualism of motivation is morally adequate (let alone true). Even if we agree that the interest of pure practical reason (respect for the law) is primarily directed at volition or action while inclination is directed at states of a airs, why should the former be moral and the latter amoral One might even harbour the suspicion that an interest in doing something is self-centred or egotistical in a way that an interest that something change or be done is not.

32 Kant s text sometimes invites this objection. Consider, for instance, the following passage from the review of heteronomous ethical theories at the end of Section II (G IV 441):. Thus, for example , I ought to try to further the happiness of others, not as if its existence were of any consequence to me [nicht als wenn mir an deren Existenz was gelegen w re] (whether because of immediate inclination or because of some indirect agreeableness through reason), but simply because a maxim that excludes this cannot be included as a universal law in one and the same volition.. What would Kant s Data Matrix 2d barcode for .NET response be The rst thing to note is that, as a consequence, someone who acts for the sake of the law intends to further the happiness of others just like the person who simply takes delight in making others happy. It is not that the Kantian moralist is exclusively interested in acting on principle, whereas our philanthropist is interested in other people s happiness.

They both want to make other people happy, if for di erent reasons. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the moralist s decision to do something e.g.

to make a friend happy rests on a moral judgement to which the friend s need, one s own ability to help etc., will have contributed. Again, the moral agent is not just motivated by an abstract principle.

The principle has enabled him to assess the situation, and draw the correct practical conclusion. Morality thus directly concerns actions, not just desirable states of a airs. Kant is saying that an amiable emotional response to the needs of others does not make us moral.

We must. In the second Cri tique, Kant argues that the consciousness of the powers of practical reason can lead to a certain detached contentment in a virtuous agent (CpV V 116 19); and as Christine Korsgaard and Marcia Baron have pointed out, it is only to be expected that an agent will display a positive emotional reaction when he perceives that a moral end is realized (see M. Baron, Acting from Duty in Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Allen Wood (trans.), Yale University Press, 2003), pp.

98 9). Of course, there is still no guarantee that developing a moral disposition will make the agent happy. Sacri ces may still be required see the third worry below.

Cf. M. Baron, Acting from Duty for the related worry that the moral person has as his purpose simply his duty (p.

96).. jens timmermann be able to do som ething about it. Moreover, we should recall one of the main points of Kant s own example: owing to the commensurability of all inclination, the philanthropist s willingness to help depends entirely on a subjective incentive that may or may not su ce to motivate the right act.33 Reverence for the law is subject to none of these uncertainties.

If such a motive can be had, it seems that we are better o with action from duty after all. Finally, recall that moral action was supposed to be immediately and unconditionally good; and that this is impossible if we act for the sake of the intended e ect of our action.34 The second worry concerns the pervasiveness of morality.

Does his theory of motivational rigorism commit Kant to the thesis that every single action must possess moral worth Is there any legitimate role left for inclination to play in human practice Or should our entire life be dominated by moral concerns In reply, one might insist on the superiority of the life of reason and the autonomy of moral decisions. Yet while there may be some truth in this response, it is fortunately unnecessary to bite this particular bullet. Of course, actions are legitimate only on condition that they do not violate the commands of morality.

It can never be permissible to act on a maxim that is completely devoid of moral content. It does not, however, follow that every single act could or should be exclusively determined by moral concerns. To begin with, Kant insists that there are morally permissible actions.

It can thus be quite legitimate to act on prudential grounds and perhaps even on direct inclination when the moral law is silent. Less obviously, even actions initiated by moral judgement are rarely completely determined by moral concerns. A principle of pure practical reason may be able to settle the question whether you should visit a friend in hospital; but it has no answer in store for you if you are wondering whether to get her red or white roses, milk chocolate with 32 or 40 per cent cocoa content, or a book, and if a book which one (and so forth).

Morality does not tell you whether to walk to the hospital, to cycle or to ask a colleague to give you lift. It does not determine the date and time of the visit. All these details are left to expediency and inclination to decide, and to your anticipation of the inclinations of your friend.

Moral action will often be composite in this way. Pure practical reason shapes the lives of moral agents. 33 34. Cf. the famous ex ample of the man who prefers spending the little money in his pocket on a ticket for the comedy to giving it to someone he usually helps with pleasure (CpV V 23). I am not certain whether these considerations can dispel the rst worry altogether.

For an extended discussion of these issues, cf. Philip Stratton-Lake, Kant, Duty and Moral Worth (London: Routledge, 2000)..

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