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pauline kleingeld use .net datamatrix 2d barcode generator toattach data matrix barcode on .net Microsoft Office Excel Website concerns and self-con visual .net barcode data matrix ceptions .23 In some sense, Kant does o er a nonmoral route in the Critique of Practical Reason: the entire argument can be cast in (presumably non-moral ) terms of a theory of action and be regarded as the articulation of the self-understanding of agents who take themselves to be reasoning about which maxims to adopt and why.

But this argument is not a mysterious route into morality. The fundamental law of rational agency is, as Kant puts it, what we call the moral law . Morality is nothing other than the (set of) standard(s) determining how we ought to act.

If how we ought to act is determined by a single rational principle, as Kant claims it is (viz., the categorical imperative as the fundamental law of pure practical reason), then this rational principle is suitably called the moral law. There is nothing enigmatic about that.

By saying that the relation between the arguments of the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason needs to be re-evaluated, I do not mean to imply that his arguments in the two books are identical. The most striking di erence is Kant s reversal of the order of the argument concerning freedom. In the Groundwork he argues from freedom of the will to the moral law, whereas in the second Critique, the argument proceeds from consciousness of the moral law to freedom of the will.

Thus, even though the aim of Kant s argument in the second Critique shows more continuity with the Groundwork than is usually thought, Kant s argumentative strategies in pursuing this aim are di erent in important respects. Now someone might wonder whether this reconstruction of Kant s argument in the Critique of Practical Reason does not wrongly present the belief in freedom of the will as an inference from the mere capacity to reason as such, and whether in doing so it does not lose sight of the fact that Kant s defence of freedom appeals speci cally to moral consciousness. In the false testimony example, Kant relies on the agent s recognition of the authority of morality, and not on a general capacity to reason, to back up the belief in freedom.

Hence, one could think, there is still a moral remainder that cannot be captured by an analysis of the argument in terms of practical reason. In response to this worry, it is important to point out that Kant certainly did not argue, in the second Critique, that the mere capacity for means ends reasoning could su ce to show us that our will is free. The employment of practical reason in the service of an end given by inclination, even if this end is a very general one such as one s happiness, does not su ce to show us our freedom.

Thus, whether or not one is able to resist one s lustful inclination when threatened with execution at the gallows should one give in to it, one. Sussman, From Deduct ion to Deed , 65; see also Ameriks, Interpreting Kant s Critiques, 256 9.. Moral consciousness and the fact of reason does not learn of one s freedom here (see CpV 5:30). Only when one realizes that one could act against all of one s inclinations, as in the false testimony example, does one become aware of one s freedom in the sense required by Kant. In such cases it is not inclination which is conceived as determining the will, but pure practical reason.

Only such cases, and not instrumental practical reasoning, disclose the freedom of the will. One objection has not yet been touched upon, and this is the claim that the belief that we are morally obligated does not prove we are, that morality might be a gment of the brain, and that freedom of the will (of the Kantian variety) could be a mere illusion. In assessing the strength of this objection, it is crucial to remind oneself of Kant s distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning.

From a theoretical perspective, Kant holds, all our actions (not just some of them) as appearances are entirely determined by natural causal laws. But Kant denies that it is possible for agents qua deliberating agents (that is, from the practical standpoint) consciously to regard their own judgments as determined by natural causes.24 From the perspective of deliberating agents no inclination sets absolute limits to their own freedom.

Kant s argument for the assumption of freedom has a conclusion that is indeed radical. This is what the false testimony example is meant to illustrate: agents judge that they can determine their will in accordance with what is right, because they judge that they ought to do so. But what are we to say about the possible illusoriness of this judgment, i.

e. this belief in freedom of the will Believing something does not make it so, and therefore it has been objected that having the consciousness of the fundamental law, and hence having the belief in freedom of the will, does not guarantee that we are really free.25 Note, however, again looking back to the false testimony example, that Kant s argument establishes that one must judge that one can (i.

e. that one must judge that one is free), not that one really can. The latter claim would entail metaphysical knowledge of freedom from an objective and theoretical point of view.

Kant, however, does not claim to prove freedom in that sense; his project in the Critique of Pure Reason led to the conclusion that doing so is impossible. But the rst. See his comment in th ECC200 for .NET e Groundwork that it is impossible to conceive of a rational being that consciously regards its own judgments as determined by natural causes (G 4:448), because then such a rational being would not count these judgments as its own. Barbara Herman presses the point that believing we are able to act from respect for the moral law does not bootstrap us up to transcendental freedom .

Barbara Herman, Justi cation and Objectivity: Comments on Rawls and Allison , in Eckhart F rster (ed.), Kant s Transcendental Deductions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 131 41, here 135..

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